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Abstract. Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples. Prior defenses attempted to make deep networks more robust by
either changing the network architecture or augmenting the training set
with adversarial examples, but both have inherent limitations. Motivated
by recent research that shows outliers in the training set have a high neg-
ative influence on the trained model, we studied the relationship between
model robustness and the quality of the training set. We first show that
outliers give the model better generalization ability but weaker robust-
ness. Next, we propose an adversarial example detection framework, in
which we design two methods for removing outliers from training set to
obtain the sanitized model and then detect adversarial example by cal-
culating the difference of outputs between the original and the sanitized
model. We evaluated the framework on both MNIST and SVHN. Based
on the difference measured by Kullback-Leibler divergence, we could de-
tect adversarial examples with accuracy between 94.67% to 99.89%.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have demonstrated impressive performance on many hard
perception problems [8,11]. However, they are vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples [17,6,15], which are maliciously crafted to be perceptually close to normal
examples but which cause misclassification. Prior defenses against adversarial
examples fall into the following categories: 1. Incorporating adversarial exam-
ples in the training set, a.k.a. adversarial training [17,6] 2. Modifying the network
architecture or training method, e.g., defense distillation [16] 3. Modifying the
test examples, e.g., MagNet [13] The first defense requires knowledge about the
process for generating adversarial examples, while the last two defenses require
high expertise and are often not robust [2].
We propose a new direction to strengthen deep neural networks against ad-
versarial examples. Recent research showed that outliers in the training set are
highly influential on the trained model. For example, outliers may be ambiguous
images on which the model has low confidence and thus high loss [7]. Our insight
is that outliers give the model better generalization ability however also make
the model more sensitive to adversarial examples. When we detect and discard
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outliers in the training set, the new model will be less sensitive to adversarial
examples. And we utilize the sensitivity difference between the original model
and the new model to distinguish adversarial examples from normal examples.
We call the process of removing outliers from the training set sanitization.1
We propose two methods for detecting outliers. First, for some AI tasks, we may
find canonical examples. For example, for handwritten digit classification, we
may use computer fonts as canonical examples. We trained a canonical model
using canonical examples, and then used the canonical model to detect outliers
in the training set. We call this method canonical sanitization. Second, for AI
tasks without canonical examples, we considered examples with large training
errors as outliers. We call this method self sanitization.
After culling the training set, we trained a model called the sanitized model.
We compared the robustness of the unsanitized model, which was trained on the
entire training set, with the sanitized model on adversarial examples using two
criteria with respect to different attack methods. For IGSM attack, the criterion
is classification accuracy of adversarial examples. For Carlini & Wagner attack,
the criterion is the average distortion. In Section 3.3, the result of sanitization
exactly validates that the outliers help model do better generalization meanwhile
decrease the robustness. Given the result, the sanitized models allow us to detect
adversarial examples which is shown in Section 3.4.
To measure the sensitivity difference, we computed the Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence from the output of an example on the unsanitized model to the output
of the same example on the sanitized model and found that this divergence was
much larger for adversarial examples than for normal examples. Based on this
difference, we were able to detect the adversarial examples generated by the
Carlini & Wagner attack on MNIST and SVHN at 99.26% and 94.67% accuracy,
respectively. Compared to prior work for detecting adversarial examples (e.g.,
[14]), this approach requires no knowledge of adversarial examples.
We make the following contributions.
– We propose two methods for detecting outliers in the training set: canonical
sanitization and self-sanitization. By performing data sanitization, we show
how the outliers will affect the model’s robustness and generalization ability.
– We propose a new adversarial example detection framework based on the
sanitized model. The detector leverages the Kullback-Leibler divergence from
the unsanitized model to the sanitized model. Neither modifications to the
model structure nor data preprocessing methods are required.
2 Methodology
2.1 Definitions
– Normal examples are sampled from the natural data generating process. For
examples, images of handwritten digits.
1 Unlike data sanitization, which commonly modifies individual datum, we modify no
example but merely remove outliers from the training set.
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– Outliers are examples in the training set of normal examples. They are dif-
ficult to classify by humans. Sanitization is the process of removing outliers
from the training set.
– Adversarial examples are crafted by attackers that are perceptually close to
normal examples but that cause misclassification.
– Unsanitized models are trained with all the examples in the training set. We
assume that the training set contains only normal examples.
– Sanitized models are trained with the remaining examples after we remove
outliers from the training set.
2.2 Sanitization
Sanitization is the process of removing outliers from the training set. We propose
two automatic sanitization methods.
Canonical sanitization This approach applies to the AI tasks that have
canonical examples. For example, for handwritten digit, computer fonts may
be considered canonical examples2. Based on this observation, we use canonical
examples to discard outliers in our training set X by the following steps:
– Augment the set of canonical examples by applying common transforma-
tions, e.g., rotating and scaling computer fonts.
– Train a model f using the augmented canonical examples.
– Use f to detect and discard outliers in the training set X. An example x(i)
is an outlier if f(x(i)) has a low confidence on y(i), the class for x(i).
Self sanitization Not all AI tasks have canonical examples. For such tasks,
we use all the examples to train a model, and then discard examples that have
high training errors.
After removing outliers from the original training set, we get a sanitized set
which is used to train a model, called sanitized model. Then, we evaluate if
the sanitized model is more robust than unsanitized models using two metrics:
classification accuracy and distortion of adversarial examples.
2.3 Detecting adversarial examples
We take advantage of the Kullback-Leibler divergence [9] between the outputs
of the original and the sanitized models to depict the difference of sensitivity to
the adversarial examples. The Kullback-Leibler divergence from a distribution
P to Q is defined as
DKL (P ‖ Q) =
∑
i
P (i) log
P (i)
Q (i)
2 Some computer fonts are difficult to recognize and therefore are excluded from our
evaluation
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By setting a proper threshold, we are able to detect nearly all adversarial
examples with acceptable false reject rate. No modifications to the original model
structure or other data outside the original dataset are required.
The detection method is hard to distinguish between adversarial examples
and normal examples when the distortion of the adversarial image is very small.
To address this problem, we designed a complete adversarial example detection
framework. We will discuss the framework detailedly in Section 3.4.
3 Evaluation
3.1 Set up
We used two data sets, MNIST3 and SVHN4, to evaluate our proposed method.
We performed both canonical sanitization and self sanitization on MNIST and
only self sanitization on SVHN. For SVHN, we pre-processed it with the following
steps to get individual clean digit images. After the process, we obtained 40 556
images from the original SVHN training set and 9790 test images from the
original SVHN test set.
1. Cropping individual digits using the bounding boxes.
2. Discarding images whose either dimension is less than 10.
3. Resizing the larger dimension of each image to 28 while keeping the aspect
ratio, and then padding the image to 28× 28. When padding an image, we
used the average color of the border as the padding color.
The models we used to train these two datasets are different. We designed
Convolutional Neural Networks for MNIST and SVHN separately. Correspond-
ingly, we achieved an accuracy of 99.3% and 98.62% on the unsanitized models.
– MNIST CNN: Input → (Conv + Pool) * 2 → FC → FC → Output
– SVHN CNN: Input → (Conv + Conv + Pool) * 3 → FC → FC → Output
Given the trained model, we performed two popular attacks, Iterative Gra-
dient Sign Method (IGSM) [6,10] and Carlini & Wagner’s attack [2], to attack
the CNN models. We will discuss the attacks in Section 3.3.
3.2 Sanitization
Canonical sanitization We did canonical sanitization on MNIST by discard-
ing outliers that are far different from canonical examples. We chose 340 fonts
containing digits as canonical examples. To accommodate variations in hand-
writing, we also augmented the fonts by scaling and rotation. After the aug-
mentation, we acquired 71 400 images, from which we randomly chose 80% as
the training set and the remaining 20% as the test set. We trained the MNIST
3 http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
4 http://ufldl.stanford.edu/housenumbers/
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(a) Confidence < 0.7 (b) Confidence > 0.999 99
Fig. 1: Examples in MNIST with low and high confidence, respectively.
Threshold 0 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9999
Set size 60 000 51 241 50 425 49 128 44 448 38 230 30 618
Table 1: Size of the MNIST training set after discarding examples whose confi-
dence scores on the canonical model are below a threshold
CNN on canonical examples and achieved an accuracy of 98.7%. We call this the
canonical model.
We fed each example in MNIST training set to the canonical model. If the
example’s confidence score of the correct class was below a threshold, we consid-
ered it an outlier and discarded it. Figure 1 shows examples with low and high
confidence. Table 1 shows the number of examples left under different thresholds.
We used these examples to train the sanitized models.
Self-sanitization We did self sanitization on both MNIST and SVHN. To dis-
card outliers in self sanitization, we trained the CNN for MNIST and SVHN
separately, used the models to test every example in the training set, and con-
sidered examples whose confidence scores were below a threshold as outliers.
Table 2 and Table 3 show the number of examples left under different thresh-
olds. We used these examples to train the sanitized models. Table 3 also shows
that the sanitized models maintain high classification accuracy when it has ad-
equate training data to prevent overfitting.
3.3 Robustness against adversarial examples
We ran the IGSM and Carlini & Wagner attacks on both the unsanitized and
sanitized models.
IGSM attack Figure 2 compares the classification accuracy of the unsanitized
and sanitized models on the adversarial examples generated by the IGSM attack
on MNIST, where Figure 2a and Figure 2b correspond to canonical sanitization
and self sanitization, respectively.
Figure 2 shows that a higher threshold of sanitization increases the robustness
of the model against adversarial examples and maintains classfication accuracy
on normal examples. For example, on adversarial examples generated after five
iterations of IGSM, the classification accuracy is 82.8% with a threshold of 0.9999
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Table 2: Size of the MNIST training set after discarding examples whose confi-
dence scores on the self-trained model are below a threshold
Threshold 0 0.999 0.9999 0.999 99 0.999 999 0.999 999 9
Set size 60 000 56 435 52 417 45 769 36 328 24 678
Table 3: The sizes of the sanitized SVHN training set and the classification
accuracy of the self-sanitized models at different thresholds
Threshold Training set size Classification accuracy (%)
0 40 556 94.26
0.7 39 330 93.68
0.8 38 929 93.22
0.9 38 153 92.74
0.99 34 408 91.30
0.999 28 420 89.41
in canonical sanitization, and is above 92.6% with a threshold of 0.999 999 9 in
self sanitization. For normal examples, the classfication accuracy is always higher
than 95.0% in different threshold.
Carlini & Wagner’s attack We ran Carlini & Wagner’s L2 target attack
to generate adversarial examples on our sanitized models for both MNIST and
SVHN. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that the sanitized models forced the adver-
sarial examples to add larger distortions in order to fool the sanitized models.
The higher the threshold, the larger the distortion.
Discussion From the experiments, we concluded that the original dataset with
outliers has higher generalization ability but weaker robustness. With the san-
itization, the model obtained much more robustness by only sacrificing limited
generalization ability.
3.4 Detecting adversarial examples
We evaluated the effectiveness of using the Kullback-Leibler divergence to detect
adversarial examples (Section 2.3).
MNIST We generated adversarial examples on two sanitized models on MNIST:
– A canonical sanitized model. The discard threshold was set to be 0.9999.
– A self sanitized model. The discard threshold was set to be 0.999 999 9.
We computed the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the output of the unsan-
itized model to that of each of the sanitized models.
Figure 6 compares the CDF of Kullback-Leibler divergence between normal
and adversarial examples generated by IGSM after different iterations. It shows
that the majority of normal examples have very small divergence, while most
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Fig. 2: Classification accuracy of normal and IGSM adversarial MNIST examples
in different threshold. The threshold 0 represents the original data set.
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Fig. 3: Average L2 distortions of normal and C&W’s adversarial MNIST exam-
ples in different threshold. The threshold 0 represents the unsanitized model.
adversarial examples have large divergence where more iterations generated ex-
amples with higher divergence. Figure 7 compares the CDF of Kullback-Leibler
divergence between normal and adversarial examples generated by the Carlini
& Wagner attack using different confidence levels, which is more prominent.
Table 4 shows the accuracy of detecting adversarial examples based on the
KL divergence from the unsanitized model to a canonical sanitized model. We
used a threshold of KL divergence to divide normal and adversarial examples:
examples below this threshold were considered normal, and all above adversarial.
We determined the threshold by setting a target detection accuracy on normal
examples. For example, when we set this target accuracy to 98%, we needed a
threshold of KL divergence of 0.0068. At this threshold, the accuracy of detecting
all the Carlini & Wagner adversarial examples at all the confidence levels is all
above 95%. The accuracy of detecting IGSM adversarial examples is high when
the number of iterations is high (e.g., 10 or 15). When the number of iterations is
low (e.g., 5), the detection accuracy decreases; however, since the false negative
examples have low KL divergence, they are more similar to normal examples
and therefore can be classified correctly with high probability as discussed next.
To take advantage of both the KL divergence for detecting adversarial exam-
ples and the sanitized models for classifying examples, we combined them into
a framework shown in Figure 8. The framework consists of a detector, which
computes the KL divergence from the unsantized model to the sanitized model
and rejects the example if its divergence exceeds a threshold, and a classifier,
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Fig. 4: Average L2 distortions of normal
and C&W’s adversarial SVHN exam-
ples in different threshold. The thresh-
old 0 represents the unsanitized model.
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Fig. 5: SVHN: CDF of the KL diver-
gence from the output of unsanitized
model to that of a sanitized model with
different C&W attack condidences.
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Fig. 6: MNIST: CDF of KL divergence from the output of the unsanitized model
to the output of a sanitized model with different IGSM iterations.
which infers the class of the example using the sanitized model. The framework
makes a correct decision on an example when
– if the example is regard as normal, the classifier correctly infers its class.
– if the example is adversarial, the detector decides the example as adversarial
or the classifier correctly infers its true class.
Table 5 shows the accuracy of this system on adversarial exampled generated
by the IGSM attack on a canonical sanitized model on MNIST. At each tested
iteration of the IGSM attack, the accuracy of this system on adversarial examples
is above 94%. The accuracy of this system on the normal examples is 94.8%.
SVHN Figure 5 compares the CDF of the Kullback-Leibler divergence of normal
examples and adversarial examples generated by the Carlini & Wagner attack at
different confidence levels. We trained the sanitized model with a discard thresh-
old 0.9 (self sanitization). We can see normal examples have small divergence,
while all the Carlini & Wagner adversarial examples under difference confidence
levels have large divergence.
Table 6 shows the impact of sanitization threshold on the detection accuracy
on adversarial examples generated by the Carlini & Wagner attack. We auto-
matically determined the threshold of KL divergence by setting the detection
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Fig. 7: MNIST: CDF of KL divergence from the output of the unsanitized model
to the output of a sanitized model with different C&W confidences.
Attack IGSM (iterations) Carlini & Wagner (confidence)
Attack parameter 5 10 15 0 0.1 0.5 1 3 5
Detection accuracy (%) 33.80 85.47 96.31 99.26 99.26 100.00 99.26 98.52 95.56
Table 4: MNIST: Accuracy of detecting adversarial examples based on the
Kullback-Leibler divergence from the unsanitized model to a canonical sanitized
model when detection accuracy for normal examples is 98%.
accuracy on normal examples to 94%. Table 6 shows that as the sanitization
threshold increases from 0.7 to 0.9, the detection accuracy increases. However,
after the sanitization threshold increases even further, the detection accuracy
decreases. This is because after the sanitization threshold exceeds 0.9, the size
of the training set decreases rapidly, which causes the model to overfit.
4 Discussion and future work
From the observation in Section 3.3 that the sanitized models will obtain higher
robustness, we speculate the causation of this phenomenon is that the outliers
will extend the decision boundary and give the model better generalization abil-
ity. However, since the outliers are usually not of big proportion and not represen-
tative, the extended decision boundary would also include adversarial examples.
We call this phenomenon as ’negative generalization’.
The state-of-the-art techniques of handling the negative generalization prob-
lem are various advanced adversarial retraining methods, which use adversarial
examples as a part of the training data and force the model to correctly clas-
sify. These methods are essentially enriching the proportion of the outliers and
making the decision boundary more sophisticated to improve the robustness.
In this paper, we focus on another direction. By culling the dataset, we re-
strict the decision boundary thus also limit the negative generalization on the
sanitized model. The sanitized model can help to make a gap of the negative
generalization (sensitivity to adversarial examples) between itself and the origi-
nal model, while the capability of classifying normal examples for both models
would stay similar. This lets us leverage the gap to detect adversarial examples.
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Detector
DKL(X) > threshold
Example X
Yes
X is adversarial
Classifier
using sanitized model
Class label y
No
Fig. 8: A framework combining a detector, which detects if an example is adver-
sarial based on the KL divergence from the unsantized model to the sanitized
model, and a classifier, which classifies the example using the sanitized model.
IGSM iterations
Accuracy (%)
Detector Classifier Overall
5 33.80 99.84 99.89
10 85.47 72.72 96.03
15 96.31 1.71 96.37
Table 5: Accuracy of the framework in Figure 8. The column “detection”, “clas-
sifier”, and “overall” shows the accuracy of the detector, classifier, and system
overall. The overall accuracy on normal examples is 94.8%.
Section 3.4 showed that we can use the Kullback-Leibler divergence as a
reliable metric to distinguish between normal and adversarial examples. In our
future work, we plan to evaluate if the attacker can generate adversarial examples
to evade our detection if she knows our detection method.
5 Related work
Most prior work on machine learning security focused on improving the network
architecture, training method, or incorporating adversarial examples in train-
ing [1]. By contrast, we focus on culling the training set to remove outliers to
improve the model’s robustness.
5.1 Influence of training examples
Influence functions is a technique from robust statistics to measure the estimator
on the value of one of the points in the sample [5,18]. Koh et al. used influence
functions as an indicator to track the behavior from the training data to the
models prediction [7]. By modifying the training data and observing its corre-
sponding prediction, the influence functions can reveal insight of model. They
found that some ambiguous training examples were effective points that led to a
low confidence model. Influence Sketching [19] proposed a new scalable version
of Cooks distance [3,4] to prioritize samples in the generalized linear model [12].
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Table 6: SVHN: the impact of sanitization threshold on the accuracy of detecting
adversarial examples based on the KL divergence
Sanitization Training KL divergence Detection accuracy (%)
threshold set size threshold Attack confidence
0 0.5 1
0.7 39 330 0.7295 93.50 94.56 94.67
0.8 38 929 0.5891 93.56 94.67 95.72
0.9 38 153 0.7586 94.67 94.78 95.78
0.99 34 408 1.0918 90.00 91.17 92.56
0.999 28 420 1.6224 83.22 85.78 87.33
The predictive accuracy changed slightly from 99.47% to 99.45% when they
deleted 10% ambiguous examples from the training set.
5.2 Influence of test examples
Xu et al. [20] observed that most features of test examples are unnecessary for
prediction, and that superfluous features facilitate adversarial examples. They
proposed two methods to reduce the feature space: reducing the color depth of
images and using smoothing to reduce the variation among pixels. Their feature
squeezing defense successfully detected adversarial examples while maintaining
high accuracy on normal examples.
6 Conclusion
Adversarial examples remain a challenging problem despite recent progress in
defense. In this paper, we study the relationship between outliers in the data set
and model robustness and propose a framework for detecting adversarial exam-
ples without modifying the original model architecture. We design two methods
to detect and remove outliers in the training set and used the remaining ex-
amples to train a sanitized model. On both MNIST and SVHN, the sanitized
models improved the classification accuracy on adversarial examples generated
by the IGSM attack and increased the distortion of adversarial examples gener-
ated by the Carlini & Wagner attack, which indicates that the sanitized model
is less sensitive to adversarial examples. Our detection is essentially leveraging
the different sensitivity to adversarial examples of the model trained with and
without outliers. We found that the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the un-
sanitized model to the sanitized model can be used to measure this difference
and detect adversarial examples reliably.
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